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Abstract
It has conventionally been argued that trade liberalization will degrade the environment of a
country that imports a good whose consumption gives rise to pollution. By contrast, this note
demonstrates that, if the linkage between the trade and the environmental policies has been
taken into consideration, then liberalizing trade in a good that generates consumption−type
negative externalities will actually improve the environment of the importing country.
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The impact of trade liberalization on the environment has become the focus of
much attention and debate. Opponents of trade liberalization fear that the expan-
sion of consumption and production activities that result from trade liberalization
will result in a worsening of the environment.1 Previous studies such as Anderson
(1992) have shown that liberalizing trade in a good whose consumption gives rise to
pollution will cause a country's environment to deteriorate if the good is imported.
Such environmental degradation associated with international trade appears to make
trade liberalization less attractive.
When analyzing the environmental eects of trade liberalization, Anderson (1992)
assumes that environmental regulations are exogenously xed. However, environ-
mental regulations are expected to react to changes in trade policies. The aim of this
note is to demonstrate that if the linkage between the environmental and the trade
policies has been considered, then a tari reduction in a country importing a good
whose consumption gives rise to pollution will improve that country's environment.
Our argument makes trade liberalization more desirable from the point of view of
environmental protection.
To this end, we construct a trade model with an imperfectly competitive product
market. A Home rm and a Foreign rm produce a homogeneous good and compete
in the Home market. All of the Home rm's output is sold in the domestic market,
and none is exported. Consumption of the good in question gives rise to pollution.
An environmental tax is imposed on the dirty good, and the imported items are
subject to a tari as well.
The major nding of this note is that an exogenous reduction in the tari on the
dirty good will improve the importing country's environment. As we will demon-
strate, the environmental tax increases as the tari rate decreases. Such a linkage
eect of tari reduction that tightens the environmental regulation will outweigh
the direct eect of tari reduction, and thus pollution will be reduced as a result of
trade liberalization.
There is now an extensive literature on the environmental eects of trade lib-
eralization (see Schulze and Ursprung (2001) for a comprehensive survey). Most
of the literature only considers negative externalities associated with production,2
1Proponents of free trade in turn argue that trade per se is not a direct cause of environmental
problems. To eciently protect the environment, governments should adopt environmental policies
rather than trade policies. See Anderson and Blackhurst (1992).
2See, for example, Markusen (1975), Copeland (1994), and Burguet and Sempere (2003), among
others.
1but here we shall deal with negative externalities associated with consumption.3
In considering consumption-type pollution, Krutilla (1991) focuses attention on the
determination of environmental regulations, and disregards the eects of trade liber-
alization on pollution control, which is the focus of this note. Bommer and Schulze
(1999), Fredriksson (1999) and Damania, et al. (2003) discuss the impact of tari
reductions on the environment within the framework of political economy, whereas
this note makes reference to a benevolent government that seeks to maximize na-
tional welfare.
2. The Model
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, with each having one rm producing
a homogeneous product. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk (). The sales
of the Home rm and the Foreign rm are denoted by q and q, respectively.
We assume that all consumers in the Home country are identical, and normal-
ize the size of the population in the Home country to one. The representative
consumer derives utility from consuming the good under consideration, as well as
a competitive-produced numeraire good, and suers from consumption-type pollu-









);  > 0 (1)
where m is the consumption of the numeraire good, and  is the coecient of the
marginal pollution damage. When making the consumption decisions, the represen-
tative consumer is assumed to ignore the negative externality. Then, by solving the
optimization problem of the Home consumer, we can derive the domestic demand
function for the good in question, which is given by:
p =    (q + q
)
where p denotes the price of the good. We assume that  is greater than .4
3The distinction between the consumption and production externalities is crucial. Anderson
(1992) has shown that a lowering of the tari on a good whose production gives rise to pollution will
improve the importing country's environment, which is quite dierent from the case of consumption
externalities.
4If  > , it means that the marginal damage from the dirty consumption is greater than the
marginal utility from dirty consumption, which is equal to  q q. We rule out this situation. In
addition, when ignoring the pollution damage costs, satiation will set in with the utility function
at  = q+q. If q+q > , then the marginal utility of consumption is negative. We assume that
 is suciently large to prevent this from happening.
2The consumption of the good under consideration gives rise to negative exter-
nalities; SO2 emissions associated with home heat consumption is an example of
consumption-type externalities. We assume that the consumption pollution does
not aect rms' production and does not spill over to other countries. In order
to protect the environment, the Home country levies an environmental tax on the
polluting good. This environmental tax is non-discriminatory, so that both the im-
ported and domestic-made goods are subject to the same environmental tax rate.5 In
addition to the environmental charge, the Home country levies a tari on imported
items. Tax revenues are distributed in the form of a lump sum to the consumer.
For simplicity, we assume that the output of the Home rm is not exported
overseas.6 The Home rm's total prot is thus given by:
 = (p   c   t)q (2)
where t denotes the environmental tax, and c is the marginal production cost. The
Foreign rm's total prot is:

 = (p   c
   t   )q
 (3)
where  is the tari rate.
The two rms compete in terms of quantity. Under the Nash assumption, by




=    2q   q
   c   t = 0 (4)
@
@q =    2q
   q   c
   t    = 0 (5)
The output levels under the Nash equilibrium are obtained by solving eqs.(4)
and (5):
q = (   2c + c
   t + )=3 (6)
q
 = ( + c   2c
   t   2)=3 (7)
The comparative-static exercises reveal that an increase in t reduces both q and
q by the same amount. The comparative-static results also show that a decrease in
 will increase q but decrease q. The decrease in q is less than the increase in q,
and thus the total consumption in the Home country expands as  decreases.
5In this situation, the environmental tax is equivalent to a consumption tax.
6If the Home market and the Foreign market are segmented, then allowing the Home rm's
output to be exported will not change the following results.
33. The Environmental Tax
In this section, we discuss the determination of the environmental tax. The
objective of the Home government is to maximize the social welfare function, which
is dened as the summation of the consumer's surplus and the Home rm's prots,
tax and tari revenues and pollution costs. Thus, the Home country's social welfare
function is given by:
W = u(q;q
)   pq   pq
 +  + t(q + q
) + q
   (q + q
)





   cq + (t + )q
   (q + q
) (8)
where u(q;q)   pq   pq measures the consumer's surplus.
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Since @2W=@t2 =  2=3 < 0, the second-order condition is satised.
The rst-order condition can be solved for the second-best environmental tax as
follows:




It is well known that in a closed economy with an imperfectly competitive product
market, the second-best environmental tax is generally less than the Pigouvian tax.7
This is because the optimal environmental tax should be set to balance pollution
costs and the loss in the consumer's surplus due to market imperfections. In a model
dealing with open economies like this one, in addition to considering pollution costs
and the welfare loss associated with market imperfections, the government also
employs the environmental tax to shift rents away from its trading partner. The
presence of such a rent-shifting eect will increase the environmental tax, other
things being equal. Thus, the second-best environmental tax in an open economy
can be greater or less than the marginal pollution damage , depending on the
relative strength of the rent-shifting eect and the welfare loss to the consumer
7See, e.g., Baumol and Oates (1988), Chap. 6 for more details. In addition, see Carraro, et al.
(1996) for a discussion of various related issues.
4resulting from a lower level of consumption.8
Since our main concern is the eect of trade liberalization on the environmental
regulation, which in turn has an environmental eect, we have briey discussed the
disparity between the second-best environmental tax and the Pigouvian tax as in
the above.9 We now turn to our major concern by examining the eect of a tari
reduction on the environmental tax.
Equation (9) reveals that the eects of a tari reduction on the environmental
tax can be broken down into a number of eects. First, a tari reduction will induce
a larger amount of q. In this situation, an increase in t will result in a larger
welfare loss to the consumer, making the government more reluctant to restrict the
environmental regulation. The rst term of eq.(9) describes this eect. Given the
second-best environmental tax, dierentiating the rst term of eq.(9) with respect to
 yields 2=9, which indicates that @CS=@t is increasing with , where CS denotes the
consumer's surplus. Since @CS=@t is less than zero,10 the positive relation between
@CS=@t and  means that an increase in t will result in a larger amount of welfare
loss to the consumer as the tari is reduced.
Second, at a lower tari rate, the foregone tari revenues resulting from raising
the environmental tax are reduced. This eect is presented by the fourth term of
eq.(9). Thus, the government will set a higher environmental tax, when its oppor-
tunity costs in terms of foregone tari revenues from increasing t are lower.
Third, as indicated by eqs.(6) and (7), a tari reduction will give rise to a larger
amount of q and a higher ratio of q=(q + q), which provide the government with
a stronger incentive to raise t in order to shift rents away from the Foreign rm.
This eect is reected by the third term of eq.(9), which is equal to @ET=@t, where
ET denotes the environmental tax revenues. We assume that the Home country is
located on the upward-sloping part of the Laer curve. Thus, the environmental
tax revenues increase with t, so that the third term of eq.(9) is greater than zero.
Given the second-best environmental tax, dierentiating the third term of eq.(9)
with respect to  yields  1=3, which indicates that @ET=@t is decreasing with .
This demonstrates that when the tari is reduced, a marginal increase in t brings
8In a more general model, the optimal environmental tax can be expressed as the summation of
the marginal pollution damage and adjusted terms, which reect the welfare loss to the consumer
associated with the market imperfections and the rent-shifting eect, respectively. Unfortunately,
all the adjusted terms are mixed together in eq.(10). This is a restriction of using specic functional
forms.
9Whether the second-best environmental tax is greater or less than the Pigouvian tax does not
change the results that follow.
10By substituting the optimal environmental tax (eq.(10)) into the rst term of eq.(9), we obtain
@CS=@t = 2[ 2 + 2   2c   ]=9. Since  is greater than , we have @CS=@t < 0.
5about more tax revenues, and thus shifts more rents away from the Foreign rm.
Finally, the second term of eq.(9) measures the impact of changing t on the
Home rm's prot. We nd that j@=@tj decreases as  decreases, which indicates
that trade liberalization reduces the environmental tax's adverse impact on the
Home rm's prot. As indicated before, a tari reduction will increase the total
consumption in the Home country, and thus depress the price of the dirty good. A
lower p will reduce j@=@tj. With a lower j@=@tj, the Home government is more
willing to raise t.
In sum, when the Home country's tari decreases, the welfare loss to the con-
sumer induces the government to levy a lower t, whereas the other three eects
lead to a higher t.11 Equation (10) reveals that the environmental tax increases as a
consequence of a tari reduction, which implies that the other three eects outweigh
the welfare loss to the consumer.12
4. The Eects of Trade Liberalization
Now we turn to the eects of trade liberalization. In this note, the term \trade
liberalization" is used merely in the sense of a reduction in a tari barrier. Here
we assume that the Home country is subject to an international agreement, and
is forced to decrease its tari. The total eect of trade liberalization on pollution
consists of two components: the direct eect and the linkage eect, which can be

















The rst term in the middle part of eq.(11) measures the direct eect, which is
negative. The second term reects the linkage eect, which is positive.
If the environmental tax does not change with the tari, then only the direct ef-
fect presents itself and a decrease in the tari increases the total consumption of the
dirty good and therefore increases pollution. This corresponds with the conventional
11The above analysis does not discuss the eect of trade liberalization on the marginal pollution
eect of changing t. This is because the last term of eq.(9) reveals that the marginal pollution
eect of changing t is independent of . This property is related to the constant marginal pollution
damage. If the marginal pollution damage increases with the total consumption, then a reduction in
 will increase the total consumption and total pollution, which in turn will induce the government
to levy a higher environmental tax rate.
12Alternatively, we can obtain the same result from the following comparative-static exercise:
dt=d =  (@2W=@t@)=(@2W=@t2). Since @2W=@t2 and @2W=@t@ are less than zero, dt=d is less
than zero as well.
6concept that a tari reduction in a good whose consumption gives rise to pollution
will deteriorate the importing country's environment. When the linkage eect of a
tari reduction is considered, a decrease in the tari will tighten the environmental
regulation, which will oset the pollution caused by the decrease in the tari. Equa-
tion (11) shows that the linkage eect outweighs the direct eect. An increase in t
reduces both q and q, whereas an increase in  reduces q but increases q, and thus
the consumption-restriction eect of the environmental tax is greater than that of
the tari. This result is consistent with the empirical nding provided by Wilson, et
al. (2003), who state that the trade-restrictive eects of environmental regulations
are stronger than those in relation to tari barriers.
Thus we arrive the following proposition:
Proposition: In an open economy with a linear demand, constant marginal pro-
duction and pollution costs, and in which rms compete in terms of quantity, a
tari reduction in the Home country will reduce the pollution damage associated
with consumption.
5. Conclusion
The conventional wisdom assumes that trade liberalization will degrade the en-
vironment of a country that imports a dirty good whose consumption gives rise to
pollution. This note by contrast demonstrates that, if the linkage between the trade
and the environmental policies has been taken into consideration, then liberalizing
trade in a good that generates consumption-type negative externalities will actu-
ally improve the environment of the importing country. This follows as a result
of the reverse relationship between the environmental tax and the tari, which is
also due to the dominant linkage eect of trade liberalization that tightens the en-
vironmental regulation. Therefore, this nding is in line with the view that trade
liberalization and environmental protection are compatible, rather than in conict,
with each other.
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